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EQUAL PROTECTION FOR THE CHILD IN THE WOMB
Charles E. Rice*
During 1971, the drive for liberalized abortion laws stalled after
achieving rapid successes in the preceding four years.' The law in most
American states still allows abortion only where, it is necessary to save
the life of the mother. Since 1967, however, sixteen states have relaxed
their laws to provide that abortions may now be performed in varying
situations where the life of the mother is not at stake. Some states, such
as New York, 2 allow abortions virtually on request. In other states, laws3
forbidding abortion have been declared unconstitutional by the courts.

During 1971, no further liberalization was enacted in any state. And
there was a serious effort, in New York and other states, to tighten and
even repeal the liberalizing statutes. The result was a legislative standoff
that is likely to continue through the 1972 sessions.
From the point of view of those who would protect the right of the
child in the womb to continue living, it would be desirable to emphasize, in addition to the maintenance or restoration of statutory restrictions, a new approach on the constitutional level. The Constitution
of the United States can be amended if two-thirds of the states propose
an amendment and if it is then submitted by Congress to the states to
be ratified by three-fourths of them.4 It is time to amend the United
States Constitution to make its guarantee of equal protection of the laws
applicable to the child in the womb. This could be done by inserting
the phrase "from the moment of conception" into the Fourteenth Amendment, so that it would read "nor shall any state ...

deny to any person,

from the moment of conception, within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Under any proper construction, the Constitution
already gives this protection to the child in the womb. But it ought to
be made specific for two reasons: First, to prevent any possible misconstruction that would permit the child in the womb, unlike his elder
brethren, to be killed for the convenience of others; second, and more
important, to serve an educational purpose through the campaign for
amendment to carry the issue to the American people and to afford them
a clear opportunity to choose life over death.
The Fourteenth Amendment is primarily directed at the action of
state and local governments. A similar amendment could be offered to
bind the federal government. This could be done by amending the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 6 so that it would read, "nor
*Profeaaor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law SchooL
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shall any person, from the moment of conception . . . be deprived of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'7 Both amendments, to the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments, I believe desirable.
Space limitations, however, permit a discussion here only of factors
relating to the proposed amendment of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
This suggested amendment would make explicit the status of the
child in the womb as a person-a status which, as yet, has not been
acknowledged by the Supreme Court but which is implicit in the settled
case law in other areas. In Levy v. Louisiana,s the Supreme Court said:
We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not "nonpersons." They are humans, live, and have their being. They are
clearly "persons" within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.9

The child in the womb meets these criteria of personhood under the
Equal Protection Clause. He is human, he lives, and he has his being.
That is, he is a living human being. As the highest court of New Jersey
summarized the state of scientific knowledge in 1960, "Medical authorities have long recognized that a child is in existence from the
moment of conception.' 10
The character of the child as a person is clearly recognized for purposes of tort recovery. The attitude of the law of torts toward the child
in the womb was summarized by Dean William L. Prosser:
So far as duty is concerned, if existence at the time is necessary,

medical authority has recognized long since that the child is in existence from the moment of conception, and for many purposes its

existence is recognized by the law. The criminal law regards it as a

separate entity, and the law of property considers it in being for all
purposes which are to its benefit, such as taking by will or descent.
After its birth, it has been held that it may maintain a statutory action
for the wrongful death of the parent. So far as causation is concerned, there will certainly be cases in which there are difficulties of
proof, but they are no more frequent, and the difficulties are no
greater, than as to many other medical problems. All writers who
have discussed the problem have joined in condemning the old rule,
in maintaining that the unborn child in the path of an automobile
is as much a person as the mother, and in urging that recovery should
be allowed upon proper proof.'"

It is significant that a majority of courts, keeping pace with advancing scientific knowledge, now hold that even a stillborn child may
maintain a wrongful death action where his death was caused by prenatal injury.' 2 A similar trend can be seen in the law of property. As
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9. 391
at 70.
10. SmithU.S.
v. Brennan.
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11. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th Ed., 1971) at 336.

12. Kwaterskl v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W. 2d 107 (1967);
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long ago as 1946, it was noted in Bonbrest v. Kotz]3 that:
From the viewpoint of the civil law and the law of property, a child

en ventre sa mere is not only regarded as a human being, but as such
14
from the moment of conception-which it is in fact.

The law of property has long recognized the rights of the child for
purposes which affect the property rights of that child. In Tbellusson v.
Woodjord,' 5 the court recognized the contention that a devise for the
life of a child in the womb was void because such a child was a
nonentity:
Let us see, what this non-entity can do. He may be vouched in a
recovery, though it is for the purpose of making him answer over in
value. He may be an executor. He may take under the Statute of
Distributions ....
He may take by devise. He may be entitled under a
charge for raising portions. He may have an injunction; and he may
6
have a guardian.'

When the property rules of the English common law were adopted by
American courts, the same approach was taken:
It has been the uniform and unvarying decision of all the common law
courts in respect of estate matters for at least the past two hundred
years that a child en ventre sa mere is "born" and "alive" for all
purposes for his benefit.' 7

Indeed, there is authority for the proposition that the child in the
womb will be regarded as in existence even where it is against his interest
to do so.1 8
For purposes of equity, too, the law has recognized the existence of
the child in the womb. An unborn child, for example, can compel his
father to provide him support. 19 He can compel his mother to undergo
a blood transfusion for his benefit, even where such transfusion is forbidden by the mother's religious beliefs. In Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan
Memorial Hospital v. Anderson, 0 the mother for religious reasons refused to have a blood transfusion which was necessary to save the life
of the child in her womb., The court held that the right of the child to
live outweighed the mother's right to free exercise of her religious beliefs. The court said:
We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law's protection and that an appropriate order should be made to insure blood
transfusions to the mother in the event that they
21 are necessary in the
opinion of the physician in charge at the time.
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It would be possible to multiply medical opinions22 and reinforcing
legal decisions in support of the proposition that the child in the womb
should be recognized as a person within the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause. Suffice it to say that the child in the womb satisfies
the three criteria for personhood-he is human, he lives, and he has
his being-enunciated in Levy. He is clearly alive and in being. As the
living offspring of human parents, he can be nothing else but human.
As a living human being, he is therefore a person within the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause.
Even if somehow one does not concede that the child in the womb
is a living human being, one ought at least to give him the benefit of the
doubt. Our law does not permit the execution, or imprisonment under
sentence, of a criminal unless his guilt of the crime charged is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. The innocent child in the womb is entitled
to have us resolve in his favor any doubts we may feel as to his living
humanity and his personhood. His status and his right to continue living
are widely denied him under the cover of a specious denial of his personhood. It is time to give him a protection that will be explicit and effective. The proposed amendment would not prevent the law from making
a reasonable distinction on such matters as the right to inherit and the
right to sue. But it would ensure that the child in the womb, as with
older persons, would not be subject to being killed for the convenience
of others or because those others consider him unfit to live. In terms of
his right to continue living, the proposed amendment would place the
child in the womb on a par with his elder brother. It would conform
the law to the realities of science. And its adoption would affirm the
determination of our nation to protect the liberty of all regardless of
age or condition.

22. See e.g. Patten, Foundations of Embryology

(1964) at 35, 82.

